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Abstract
We study the question of how to compute a point in the convex hull of an input set S of n
points in Rd in a differentially private manner. This question, which is trivial without privacy
requirements, turns out to be quite deep when imposing differential privacy. In particular, it is
known that the input points must reside on a fixed finite subset G ⊆ Rd, and furthermore, the
size of S must grow with the size of G. Previous works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11] focused on understanding
how n needs to grow with |G|, and showed that n = O (d2.5 · 8log∗ |G|) suffices (so n does not
have to grow significantly with |G|). However, the available constructions exhibit running time
at least |G|d2 , where typically |G| = Xd for some (large) discretization parameter X, so the
running time is in fact Ω(Xd
3
).
In this paper we give a differentially private algorithm that runs in O(nd) time, assuming
that n = Ω(d4 logX). To get this result we study and exploit some structural properties of
the Tukey levels (the regions D≥k consisting of points whose Tukey depth is at least k, for
k = 0, 1, . . . ). In particular, we derive lower bounds on their volumes for point sets S in general
position, and develop a rather subtle mechanism for handling point sets S in degenerate position
(where the deep Tukey regions have zero volume). A naive approach to the construction of the
Tukey regions requires nO(d
2) time. To reduce the cost to O(nd), we use an approximation
scheme for estimating the volumes of the Tukey regions (within their affine spans in case of
degeneracy), and for sampling a point from such a region, a scheme that is based on the volume
estimation framework of Lova´sz and Vempala [13] and of Cousins and Vempala [7]. Making this
framework differentially private raises a set of technical challenges that we address.
1 Introduction
We often would like to analyze data while protecting the privacy of the individuals that contributed
to it. At first glance, one might hope to ensure privacy by simply deleting all names and ID numbers
from the data. However, such anonymization schemes are proven time and again to violate privacy.
This gave rise of a theoretically-rigorous line of work that has placed private data analysis on firm
foundations, centered around a mathematical definition for privacy known as differential privacy [8].
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Consider a database S containing personal information of individuals. Informally, an algorithm
operating on such a database is said to preserve differential privacy if its outcome distribution is (al-
most) insensitive to any arbitrary change to the data of one individual in the database. Intuitively,
this means that an observer looking at the outcome of the algorithm (almost) cannot distinguish
between whether Alice’s information is x or y (or whether Alice’s information is present in the
database at all) because in any case it would have (almost) no effect on the outcome distribution
of the algorithm.
Definition 1.1 (Dwork et al. [8]). Two databases (multisets) S and S′ are called neighboring if
they differ in a single entry. That is, S = S0 ∪ {x} and S′ = S0 ∪ {y} for some items x and y. A
randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two neighboring databases S, S′
and for any event T we have
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε ·Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
When δ = 0 this notion is referred to as pure differential privacy, and when δ > 0 it is referred to
as approximate differential privacy.
Remark 1.2. Typically, ε is set to be a small constant, say ε = 0.1, and δ is set to be a small
function of the database size |S| (much smaller than 1/|S|). Note that to satisfy the definition (in
any meaningful way) algorithm A must be randomized.
Differential privacy is increasingly accepted as a standard for rigorous treatment of privacy.
However, even though the field has witnessed an explosion of research in the recent years, much
remains unknown and answers to fundamental questions are still missing. In this work we study
one such fundamental question, already studied in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11]: Given a database containing
points in Rd (where every point is assumed to be the information of one individual), how can we
privately identify a point in the convex hull of the input points? This question, which is trivial
without privacy requirements, turns out to be quite deep when imposing differential privacy. In
particular, Bun et al. [5] showed that in order to be able to solve it, we must assume that the input
points reside on a fixed finite subset G ⊆ Rd, and furthermore, the number of input points must
grow with the size of G.
The Private Interior Point (PIP) Problem.
Let β, ε, δ,X be positive parameters where β, ε, δ are small and X is a large integer. Let
G ⊆ [0, 1]d be a finite uniform grid with side steps 1/X (so |G| = (X + 1)d). Design an
algorithm A such that for some n ∈ N (as small as possible as a function of β, ε, δ,X) we have
1. Utility: For every database S containing at least n points from G it holds that A(S)
returns a point in the convex hull of S with probability at least 1− β. (The outcome of
A does not have to be in G.)
2. Privacy: For every pair of neighboring databases S, S′, each containing n points from
G, and for any event T , we have Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε ·Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
The parameter n is referred to as the sample complexity of the algorithm. It is the smallest
number of points on which we are guaranteed to succeed (not to be confused with the actual size
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of the input). The PIP problem is very natural on its own. Furthermore, as was observed in [2], an
algorithm for solving the PIP problem can be used as a building block in other applications with
differential privacy, such as learning halfspaces and linear regression. Previous works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11]
have focused on the task of minimizing the sample complexity n while ignoring the runtime of the
algorithm. In this work we seek an efficient algorithm for the PIP problem, that still keeps the
sample complexity n “reasonably small” (where “reasonably small” will be made precise after we
introduce some additional notation).
1.1 Previous Work
Several papers studied the PIP problem for d = 1. In particular, three different constructions with
sample complexity 2O(log
∗ |G|) were presented in [3, 4, 5] (for d = 1). Recently, Kaplan et al. [11]
presented a new construction with sample complexity O((log∗ |G|)1.5) (again, for d = 1). Bun et
al. [5] gave a lower bound showing that every differentially private algorithm for this task must
have sample complexity Ω(log∗ |G|). Beimel et al. [2] incorporated a dependency in d to this lower
bound, and showed that every differentially private algorithm for the PIP problem must use at
least n = Ω(d+ log∗ |G|) input points.
For the case of pure differential privacy (i.e., δ = 0), a lower bound of n = Ω(logX) on the sample
complexity follows from the results of Beimel et al. [1]. This lower bound is tight, as an algorithm
with sample complexity n = O(logX) (for d = 1) can be obtained using a generic tool in the
literature of differential privacy, called the exponential mechanism [15]. We sketch this application
of the exponential mechanism here. (For a precise presentation of the exponential mechanism see
Section 2.1.) Let G = {0, 1X , 2X , . . . , 1} be our (1-dimensional) grid within the interval [0, 1], and
let S be a multiset containing n points from G. The algorithm is as follows.
1. For every y ∈ G define the score qS(y) = min {|{x ∈ S | x ≥ y}|, |{x ∈ S | x ≤ y}|} .
2. Output y ∈ G with probability proportional to eε·qS(y).
Intuitively, this algorithm satisfies differential privacy because changing one element of S
changes the score qS(y) by at most ±1, and thus changes the probabilities with which we sample
elements by roughly an eε factor. As for the utility analysis, observe that ∃y ∈ G with qS(y) ≥ n2 ,
and the probability of picking this point is (at least) proportional to eεn/2. As this probability
increases exponentially with n, by setting n to be big enough we can ensure that points y′ outside
of the convex hull (those with qS(y
′) = 0) get picked with very low probability.
Beimel et al. [2] observed that this algorithm extends to higher dimensions by replacing qS(y)
with the Tukey depth tdS(y) of the point y with respect to the input set S (the Tukey depth of a
point y is the minimal number of points that need to be removed from S to ensure that y is not
in the convex hull of the remaining input points). However, even though there must exist a point
y ∈ Rd with high Tukey depth (at least n/(d + 1); see [14]), the finite grid G ⊆ Rd might fail to
contain such a point. Hence, Beimel et al. [2] first refined the grid G into a grid G′ that contains
a point with high Tukey depth, and then randomly picked a point y from G′ with probability
proportional to eε·tdS(y). To compute the probabilities with which grid points are sampled, the
algorithm in [2] explicitly computes the Tukey depth of every point in G′, which, because of the
way in which G′ is defined, results in running time of at least Ω(|G|d2) = Ω(Xd3) and sample
complexity n = O(d3 log |G|) = O(d4 logX). Beimel et al. then presented an improvement of this
algorithm with reduced sample complexity of n = O(d2.5 · 8log∗ |G|), but the running time remained
Ω(|G|d2) = Ω(Xd3).
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1.2 Our Construction
We give an approximate differentially private algorithm for the private interior point problem that
runs in O(nd) time,1 and succeeds with high probability when the size of its input is Ω(d
4
ε log
X
δ ).
Our algorithm is obtained by carefully implementing the exponential mechanism and reducing its
running time from Ω(|G|d2) = Ω(Xd3) to O(nd). We now give an informal overview of this result.
To avoid the need to extend the grid and to calculate the Tukey depth of each point in the
extended grid, we sample our output directly from [0, 1]d. To compute the probabilities with which
we sample a point from [0, 1]d we compute, for each k in an appropriate range, the volume of the
Tukey region of depth k, which we denote as Dk. (That is, Dk is the region in [0, 1]
d containing all
points with Tukey depth exactly k.) We then sample a value k ∈ [n] with probability proportional
to Vol(Dk) · eεk, and then sample a random point uniformly from Dk.
Observe that this strategy picks a point with Tukey depth k with probability proportional to
Vol(Dk) · eεk. Hence, if for a “large enough” value of k (say k ≥ ncd for a suitable absolute constant
c > 1) we have that Vol(Dk) is “large enough”, then a point with Tukey depth k is picked with
high probability. However, if Vol(Dk) = 0 (or too small) then a point with Tukey depth k is picked
with probability zero (or with too small a probability). Therefore, to apply this strategy, we derive
a lower bound on the volume of every non-degenerate Tukey region, showing that if the volume is
non-zero, then it is at least Ω
(
1/Xd
3
)
.
There are two issues here. The first issue is that the best bound we know on the complexity of
a Tukey region is O(n(d−1)bd/2c), so we cannot compute these regions explicitly (in the worst-case)
in time O(nd) (which is our target runtime complexity). We avoid the need to compute the Tukey
regions explicitly by using an approximation scheme for estimating the volume of each region and
for sampling a point from such a region, a scheme that is based on the volume estimation framework
of Lova´sz and Vempala [13] and of Cousins and Vempala [7]. The second issue is that it might be
the case that all Tukey regions for large values of k are degenerate, i.e., have volume 0, in which
case this strategy might fail to identify a point in the convex hull of the input points.
Handling degeneracies. We show that if the Tukey regions of high depth are degenerate, then
many of the input points must lie in a lower-dimensional affine subspace. This can be used to
handle degenerate inputs S as follows. We first (privately) check whether there exists an affine
proper subspace that contains many points of S. If we find such a subspace f , we recursively
continue the procedure within f , with respect to S ∩ f . Otherwise, if no such subspace exists, then
it must be the case that the Tukey regions of high depth are full-dimensional (with respect to the
subspace into which we have recursed so far), so we can apply our algorithm for the non-degenerate
case and obtain a point that lies, with high probability, in the convex hull of the surviving subset
of S, and thus of the full set S.
We remark that it is easy to construct algorithms with running time polynomial in the input
size n, when n grows exponentially in d. (In that case one can solve the problem using a reduction
to the 1-dimensional case.) In this work we aim to reduce the running time while keeping the
sample complexity n at most polynomial in d and in log |G|.
1When we use O-notation for time complexity we hide logarithmic factors in X, 1/ε, 1/δ, and polynomial factors
in d. We assume operations on real numbers in O(1) time (the so-called real RAM model).
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2 Preliminaries
We assume that our input set S consists of n points that lie in the intersection of a grid G with the
cube [0, 1]d in Rd. We assume that G is of side length 1/X for a given accuracy integer parameter
X, so it partitions the cube into Xd cells.
2.1 The exponential mechanism
Let G∗ denote the set of all finite databases over a grid G, and let F be a finite set. Given a
database S ∈ G∗, a quality (or scoring) function q : G∗ × F → N assigns a number q(S, f) to
each element (S, f) ∈ G∗ × F , identified as the “quality” of f with respect to S. We say that the
function q has sensitivity ∆ if for all neighboring databases S and S′ and for all f ∈ F we have
|q(S, f)− q(S′, f)| ≤ ∆.
The exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [15] privately identifies an element f ∈ F
with large quality q(S, f). Specifically, it chooses an element f ∈ F randomly, with probability
proportional to exp (ε · q(S, f)/(2∆)). The privacy and utility of the mechanism are:
Theorem 2.1 (McSherry and Talwar [15]). The exponential mechanism is (ε, 0)-differentially pri-
vate. Let q be a quality function with sensitivity ∆. Fix a database S ∈ G∗ and let OPT =
maxf∈F {q(S, f)}. For any β ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least (1− β), the exponential mechanism
outputs a solution f with quality q(S, f) ≥ OPT− 2∆ε ln |F |β .
2.2 Tukey depth
The Tukey depth [17] tdS(q) of a point q with respect to S is the minimum number of points of S we
need to remove to make q lie outside the convex hull of the remaining subset. Equivalently, tdS(q)
is the smallest number of points of S that lie in a closed halfspace containing q. We will write td(q)
for tdS(q) when the set S is clear from the context. It easily follows from Helly’s theorem that
there is always a point of Tukey depth at least n/(d + 1) (see, e.g., [14]). We denote the largest
Tukey depth of a point by tdmax(S) (the maximum Tukey depth is always at most n/2).
We define the regions D≥k(S) =
{
q ∈ [0, 1]d | tdS(q ≥ k
}
and Dk(S) = D≥k(S) \D≥k+1(S) for
k = 0, . . . , tdmax(S). Note that D≥1 is the convex hull of S and that D≥0 = [0, 1]d. It is easy to
show that D≥k is convex; D≥k is in fact the intersection of all (closed) halfspaces containing at
least n−k+1 points of S; see [16]. It is easy to show that all this is true also when S is degenerate.
See Figure 1 for an illustration. The following lemma is easy to establish.
Lemma 2.2. If D≥k is of dimension d (we refer to such a region as non-degenerate) then Ck =
∂D≥k(S) is a convex polytope, each of whose facets is contained in a simplex σ spanned by d points
of S, such that one of the open halfspaces bounded by the hyperplane supporting σ contains exactly
k − 1 points of S.
3 The case of general position
As already said, we apply the exponential mechanism for privately identifying a point in [0, 1]d
with (hopefully) large Tukey depth with respect to the input set S. This satisfies (pure) differential
privacy since the sensitivity of the Tukey depth is 1. In this section we show that when the input
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D≥2
Figure 1: The Tukey layers D≥2 and D≥1.
points are in general position, then this application of the exponential mechanism succeeds (with
high probability) in identifying a point that has positive Tukey depth, that is, a point inside the
convex hull of S.
To implement the exponential mechanism (i.e., to sample a point from [0, 1]d appropriately),
we need to compute the Tukey regions D≥k and their volumes. In this section we compute these
regions explicitly in O
(
n1+(d−1)bd/2c
)
time. In Section 5 we will show that the cost can be reduced
to O(nd).
Computing D≥k. We pass to the dual space, and construct the arrangement A(S∗) of the
hyperplanes dual to the points of S. A point h∗ dual to a hyperplane h supporting D≥k has at
least n− k+ 1 dual hypeplanes passing below h∗ or incident to h∗, or, alternatively, passing above
h∗ or incident to h∗. Furthermore, if we move h∗ slightly down in the first case (resp., up in the
second case), the number of hypeplanes below (resp., above) it becomes smaller than n− k + 1.
When h∗ is a vertex of A(S∗) we refer to it as k-critical, or simply as critical. If D≥k is non-
degenerate then, by Lemma 2.2, each hyperplane h that supports a facet of D≥k must be spanned
by d affinely independent points of S. That is, all these hyperplanes are dual to k-critical vertices
of A(S∗).
We compute all critical dual vertices that have at least n−k+1 dual hyperplanes passing below
them or incident to them, or those with at least n− k+ 1 dual hyperplanes passing above them or
incident to them. The intersection of the appropriate primal halfspaces that are bounded by the
hyperplanes corresponding to these dual vertices is D≥k. This gives an algorithm for constructing
D≥k when it is non-degenerate. Otherwise D≥k is degenerate and its volume is 0, and we need
additional techniques, detailed in the next subsection, to handle such situations.
We compute the volume of each non-degenerate D≥k, for k = 1, . . . , tdmax(S). We do that in
brute force, by computing and triangulating D≥k and adding up the volumes of the simplices in this
triangulation. Then we subtract the volume of D≥k+1 from the volume of D≥k to get the volume
of Dk.
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The sampling mechanism. We assign to each Dk the weight e
εk/2 and sample a region Dk, for
k = 0, . . . , tdmax(S), with probability
µk =
eεk/2Vol(Dk)∑
j≥0 eεj/2Vol(Dj)
,
where Vol(Dk) denotes the volume of Dk. Then we sample a point uniformly at random from Dk.
We do this in brute force by computing Dk, triangulating it, computing the volume of each simplex,
drawing a simplex from this triangulation with probability proportional to its volume, and then
drawing a point uniformly at random from the chosen simplex.2
This is an instance of the exponential mechanism in which the score (namely the Tukey depth)
has sensitivity 1, i.e., |tdS(q)− tdS′(q)| ≤ 1 for any point q ∈ [0, 1]d, when S and S′ differ by only
one element. It thus follows from the properties of the exponential mechanism (Theorem 2.1) that
this procedure is (purely) ε-differentially private.
Complexity. Computing the dual arrangement A(S∗) takes O(nd) time [10]. Assume that D≥k
is non-degenerate and let Mk denote the number of hyperplanes defining D≥k (i.e., the hyperplanes
supporting its facets). It takes O(M
bd/2c
k ) time to construct D≥k, as the intersection of Mk halfs-
paces, which is a dual version of constructing the convex hull (see [6]). Within the same asymptotic
bound we can triangulate D≥k and compute its volume. We obviously have Mk = O(nd), but the
number can be somewhat reduced. The following lemma is known.
Lemma 3.1 (Proposition 3 in [12]). The number of halfspaces needed to construct D≥k is O(nd−1).
Proof. Fix a (d − 1)-tuple σ of points of S, and consider all the relevant (closed) halfspaces, each
of which is bounded by a hyperplane that is spanned by σ and another point of S, and contains at
least n− k + 1 points of S. It is easy to check that, as long as the intersection of these halfspaces
is full-dimensional, it is equal to the intersection of just two of them.
Summing up, we get that computing the volume of all the non-degenerate regions D≥k, for
k = 1, . . . , tdmax(S), takes O
(∑
k≥1M
bd/2c
k
)
= O
(
n1+(d−1)bd/2c
)
time.
Utility. We continue to assume that D≥k is non-degenerate, and give a lower bound on its volume.
By Lemma 2.2, such a D≥k is the intersection of halfspaces, each bounded by a hyperplane that is
spanned by d points of S. Denote by H the set of these hyperplanes. To obtain the lower bound,
it suffices to consider the case where D≥k is a simplex, each of whose vertices is the intersection
point of d hyperplanes of H.
The equation of a hyperplane h that passes through d points, a1, . . . , ad, of S is∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 x1 · · · xd
1 a1,1 · · · a1,d
...
1 ad,1 · · · ad,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0,
2A simple way to implement the last step is to draw uniformly and independently d points from [0, 1], compute
the lengths λ1, . . . , λd+1 of the intervals into which they partition [0, 1], and return
∑d+1
i=1 λivi, where v1, . . . , vd+1 are
the vertices of the simplex.
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where ai = (ai,1, . . . , ai,d), for i = 1, . . . , d. The coefficients of the xi’s in the equation of h are d×d
subdeterminants of this determinant, where each determinant has one column of 1’s, and d−1 other
columns, each of whose entries is some ai,j , which is a rational of the form m/X, with 0 ≤ m ≤ X
(the same holds for the 1’s, with m = X). The value of such a determinat (coefficient) is a rational
number with denominator Xd. By Hadamard’s inequality, its absolute value is at most the product
of the Euclidean norms of its rows, which is at most dd/2. That is, the numerator of the determinant
is an integer of absolute value at most dd/2Xd. The free term is a similar sub-determinant, but
all its entries are the ai,j ’s, so it too is a rational with denominator X
d, and with numerator of
absolute value at most dd/2Xd. Multiplying by Xd, all the coefficients become integers of absolute
value at most dd/2Xd.
Each vertex of any region Dk of Tukey depth k, for any k, is a solution of a linear system of
d hyperplane equations of the above form. It is therefore a rational number whose denominator,
by Cramer’s rule, is the determinant of all non-free coefficients of the d hyperplanes. This is an
integer whose absolute value, again by Hadamard’s inequality, is at most(√
ddd/2Xd
)d ≤ dd(d+1)/2Xd2 .
Since the free terms are also integers, we conclude that the coordinates of the intersection point
are rationals with a common integral denominator of absolute value at most dd(d+1)/2Xd
2
.
We can finally obtain a lower bound for the nonzero volume of a simplex spanned by any d+ 1
linearly independent intersection points v1, . . . , vd+1. This volume is
1
d!
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 v1,1 · · · v1,d
1 v2,1 · · · v2,d
...
1 vd+1,1 · · · vd+1,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where again vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,d), for i = 1, . . . , d+ 1. Note that all the entries in any fixed row have
the same denominator. The volume is therefore a rational number whose denominator is d! times
the product of these denominators, which is thus an integer with absolute value at most
d! ·
(
dd(d+1)/2Xd
2
)d ≤ (dX)d3
(for d ≥ 2). That is, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. If the volume of D≥k is not zero then it is at least 1/(dX)d
3
.
Assume that the volume of D≥k is not zero for k = k0 := n/(4d). Since the score of a point
outside the convex hull is zero and the volume of D≥0 is at most 1, we get that the probability to
sample a point outside of the convex hull is at most
1
eεk0Vol(Dk0)
≤ (dX)
d3
eεn/(4d)
.
This inequality leads to the following theorem, which summarizes the utility that our instance of
the exponential mechanism provides.
Theorem 3.3. If n ≥ 4d
4 log(dX)
ε
+
4d
ε
log
1
β
and D≥n/4d has non-zero volume then the exponen-
tial mechanism, implemented as above, returns a point in the convex hull with probability at least
1− β, in O (n1+(d−1)bd/2c) time.
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4 Handling degeneracies
In general we have no guarantee that D≥n/4d has non-zero volume. In this section we show how
to overcome this and compute (with high probability) a point in the convex hull of any input. We
rely on the following lemma, which shows that if D≥k has zero volume then many points of S are
in a lower-dimensional affine subspace.
Lemma 4.1. If D≥k spans an affine subspace f of dimension j then
|S ∩ f | ≥ n− (d− j + 1)(k − 1).
Proof. Recall that D≥k is the intersection of all closed halfspaces h that contain at least n− k + 1
points of S. Note that a halfspace that bounds D≥k and whose bounding hyperplane properly
crosses f , defines a proper halfspace within f , and, by assumption, the intersection of these halfs-
paces has positive relative volume. This means that the intersection of these halfspaces in Rd has
positive volume too, and thus cannot confine D≥k to f . To get this confinement, there must exist
(at least) d− j + 1 halfspaces in the above collection, whose intersection is f . Hence the union of
their complements is Rd \ f . Since this union contains at most (d− j + 1)(k − 1) points of S, the
claim follows.
In what follows, to simplify the expressions that we manipulate, we use the weaker lower bound
n − (d − j + 1)k. In order for the lemma to be meaningful, we want k to be significantly smaller
than the centerpoint bound n/(d+ 1), so we set, as above, k = n/(4d).
We use Lemma 4.1 to handle degenerate inputs S, using the following high-level approach. We
first (privately) check whether there exists an affine proper subspace that contains many points of
S. If we find such a subspace f , we recursively continue the procedure within f , with respect to
S∩f . Lemma 4.1 then implies that we do not lose too many points when we recurse within f (that
is, |S ∩ f | is large), using our choice k = n/(4d). Otherwise, if no such subspace exists, Lemma 4.1
implies that D≥k is full-dimensional (with respect to the subspace into which we have recursed so
far), so we can apply the exponential mechanism, as implemented in Section 3, and obtain a point
that lies, with high probability, in the convex hull of the surviving subset of S, and thus of the full
set S. We refer to this application of the exponential mechanism in the appropriate affine subspace
as the base case of the recursion.
The points of S ∩ f are not on a standard grid within f . (They lie of course in the standard
uniform grid G of side length 1/X within the full-dimensional cube, but G ∩ f is not a standard
grid and in general has a different, coarser resolution.) We overcome this issue by noting that there
always exist j coordinates, which, without loss of generality, we assume to be x1, . . . , xj , such that
f can be expressed in parametric form by these coordinates. We then project f (and S ∩ f) onto
the x1x2 · · ·xj-coordinate subspace f ′. We recurse within f ′, where the projected points of S ∩ f
do lie in a standard grid (a cross-section of G), and then lift the output point x′0, which lies, with
high probability, in conv(S′0), back to a point x′ ∈ f . It is straightforward to verify that if x′0 is in
the convex hull of the projected points then x′ is in the convex hull of S ∩ f .
4.1 Finding an affine subspace with many points privately
For every affine subspace f , of dimension 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1, spanned by some subset of (at least) j + 1
points of G, we denote by c(f) the number of points of S that f contains, and refer to it as the
size of f .
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We start by computing c(f) for every subspace f spanned by points of S, as follows. We
construct the (potentially degenerate) arrangement A(S∗) of the set S∗ of the hyperplanes dual
to the points of S. During this construction, we also compute the multiplicity of each flat in this
arrangement, namely, the number of dual hyperplanes that contain it. Each intersection flat of
the hyperplanes is dual to an affine subspace f defined by the corresponding subset of the primal
points of S (that it contains), and c(f) is the number of dual hyperplanes containing the flat. In
other words, as a standard byproduct of the construction of A(S∗), we can compute the sizes of all
the affine subspaces that are spanned by points of S, in O(nd) overall time.
We define
Mi = Mi(S) = max{c(f) | f is spanned by a subset of S and is of dimension at most i},
and compute M ′i = Mi+Yi, where Yi is a random variable drawn (independently for each i) from a
Laplace distribution with parameter b := 1ε centered at the origin. (That is, the probability density
function of Yi is
1
2be
−|x|/b = ε2e
−ε|x|.)
Our algorithm now uses a given confidence parameter β ∈ (0, 1) and proceeds as follows. If for
every j = 0, . . . , d− 1
M ′j ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log
2
β
, (1)
we apply the base case. Otherwise, set j to be the smallest index such that
M ′j > n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log
2
β
. (2)
Having fixed j, we find (privately) a subspace f of dimension j that contains a large number
of points of S. To do so, let Zj be the collection of all j-dimensional subspaces that are spanned
by j+ 1 affinely independent points of the grid G (not necessarily of S). We apply the exponential
mechanism to pick an element of Zj , by assigning a score s(f) to each subspace of Zj , which we
set to be
s(f) = max {0, c(f)−Mj−1} ,
if j ≥ 1, and s(f) = c(f) if j = 0. Note that by its definition, s(f) is zero if f is not spanned by
points of S. Indeed, in this case the c(f) points contained in f span some subspace of dimension
` ≤ j − 1 and therefore Mj−1 must be at least as large as c(f). We will shortly argue that s(f)
has sensitivity at most 2 (Lemma 4.4), and thus conclude that this step preserves the differential
privacy of the procedure.
We would like to apply the exponential mechanism as stated above in time proportional to
the number of subspaces of non-zero score, because this number depends only on n (albeit being
exponential in d) and not on (the much larger) X. However, to normalize the scores to probabilities,
we need to know the number of elements of Zj with zero score, or alternatively to obtain the total
number of subspaces spanned by j + 1 points of G (that is, the size of Zj).
We do not have a simple expression for |Zj | (although this is a quantity that can be computed,
for each j, independently of S, once and for all), but clearly |Zj | ≤ Xd(j+1). We thus augment
Zj (only for the purpose of analysis) with X
d(j+1) − |Zj | “dummy” subspaces, and denote the
augmented set by Z ′j , whose cardinality is now exactly X
d(j+1). We draw a subspace f from Z ′j
using the exponential mechanism. To do so we need to compute, for each score s ≥ 0, the number
Ns of elements of Z
′
j that have score s, give each such element weight e
εs/4, choose the index s
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with probability proportional to Nse
εs/4, and then choose uniformly a subspace from those with
score s. It is easy to check that this is indeed an implementation of the exponential mechanism as
described in Section 2.1.
If the drawing procedure decides to pick a subspace that is not spanned by points of S, or more
precisely decides to pick a subspace of score 0, we stop the whole procedure, with a failure. If the
selected score is positive, the subspace to be picked is spanned by j + 1 points of S, and those
subspaces are available (from the dual arrangement construction outlined above). We thus obtain
a selected subspace f (by randomly choosing an element from the available list of these subspaces),
and apply the algorithm recursively within f , restricting the input to S ∩ f . (Strictly speaking, as
noted above, we apply the algorithm to a projection of f onto a suitable j-dimensional coordinate
subspace.)
It follows that we can implement the exponential mechanism on all subspaces in Z ′j in time
proportional to the number of subspaces spanned by points of S, which is O(nd), and therefore the
running time of this subspace selection procedure (in each recursive call) is O(nd).
4.1.1 Privacy analysis
Lemma 4.2. Let S1 = S0 ∪ {x} and S2 = S0 ∪ {y} be two neighboring data sets. Then, for every
i = 0, . . . , d− 1, we have |Mi(S1)−Mi(S2)| ≤ 1.
Proof. Let f be a subspace of dimension at most i that is spanned by points of S1 and contains
Mi(S1) such points. If f does not contain x then f is also a candidate for Mi(S2), so in this case
Mi(S2) ≥Mi(S1). If f does contain x then S1 ∩ f \ {x} ⊆ S0 spans a subspace f ′ of f which is of
dimension at most i, so it is a candidate for Mi(S2). Since it does not contain x (and may contain
y) we have in this case that Mi(S2) ≥ Mi(S1) − 1. Therefore we can conclude that in anycase
Mi(S2) ≥Mi(S1)− 1. A symmetric argument shows that Mi(S1) ≥Mi(S2)− 1. Combining these
two inequalities the lemma follows.
Lemma 4.3. The value of each M ′i , for i = 0, . . . , d− 1, is ε-differentially private.
Proof. This follows from standard arguments in differential privacy (e.g., see [9, 18]), since, by
Lemma 4.2, Mi is of sensitivity 1 (in the sense shown in the lemma).
Since we choose j by comparing each of the M ′j ’s to a value which is the same for neighboring
data sets S1 and S2 (which have the same cardinality n), Lemma 4.3 implies that the choice of the
dimension j is differentially private.
The next step is to choose the actual subspace f in which to recurse. The following lemma
implies that this step too is differentially private.
Lemma 4.4. Let S1 and S2 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then, for each j = 0, . . . , d − 1 and for every
subspace f ∈ Z ′j, we have |sS1(f)− sS2(f)| ≤ 2.
Proof. Fix j and f ∈ Z ′j . Clearly, |cS1(f) − cS2(f)| ≤ 1, and, by Lemma 4.2, Mj−1 is also of
sensitivity 1, and the claim follows.
Lemma 4.5. The subspace-selection procedure described in this section (with all its recursive calls)
is 2d2ε-differentially private.
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Proof. By Lemma 4.3 the computation of each M ′i is ε-differentially private, and by Lemma 4.4 the
exponential mechanism on the scores s(f) is also ε-differentially private. Since we compute at most d
values M ′i at each step, and we recurse at most d times, the claim follows by composition [9, 18].
Remark 4.6. We can save a factor of d in Lemma 4.5 by using a framework called the sparse
vector technique, see e.g., [9].
4.1.2 Utility analysis
The following lemma is the key for our utility analysis.
Lemma 4.7. Let β ∈ (0, 1) be a given parameter. For k = n4d and for every j = 0, . . . , d − 1 the
following properties hold.
(i) If Mj ≥ n− (d− j + 1)k then, with probability at least 1− β,
M ′j ≥ n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log
2
β
.
(ii) On the other hand, if Mj ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2ε log 2β , then, with probability at least 1− β,
M ′j ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log
2
β
.
Proof. (i) follows since the probability of the Laplace noise Yj to be smaller than −1ε log 2β is at
most β, and (ii) follows since the probability of Yj to be larger than
1
ε log
2
β is also at most β.
We say that (the present recursive step of) our algorithm fails if one of the complements of
the events specified in Lemma 4.7 happens, that is, the step fails if for some j, either (i) Mj ≥
n− (d− j + 1)k and M ′j < n− (d− j + 1)k − 1ε log 2β , or (ii) Mj ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2ε log 2β and
M ′j > n− (d− j + 1)k − 1ε log 2β . Otherwise we say that (this step of) our algorithm succeeds.3
It follows from Lemma 4.1 that if the algorithm succeeds and applies the base case then D≥k
is full dimensional. Furthermore, if the algorithm succeeds and decides to recurse on a subspace of
dimension j (according to the rule in (1) and (2)) then, for every ` < j, M` ≤ n− (d− `+ 1)k and
Mj ≥ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2ε log 2β . The following lemma is an easy consequence of this reasoning.
Lemma 4.8. If the algorithm succeeds, with dimension j, and applies the exponential mechanism
to pick a j-dimensional subspace, then there exists a j-dimensional subspace f with score s(f) =
Mj −Mj−1 ≥ k − 2ε log 2β . Furthermore, if k ≥ 8d
2
ε logX +
8
ε log
1
β then, with probability at least
1− β, the exponential mechanism picks a subspace f with s(f) ≥Mj −Mj−1 − k2 ≥ k2 − 2ε log 2β .
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from the definition of success, as just argued. For the
second part notice that, since |Z ′j | ≤ Xd
2
, the probability of drawing a subspace f ′ ∈ Z ′j of score
smaller than Mj −Mj−1 − k2 is at most
Xd
2 · e
ε(Mj−Mj−1−k/2)/4
eε(Mj−Mj−1)/4
= Xd
2 · e−εk/8 .
This expression is at most β if k ≥ 8d2ε logX + 8ε log 1β .
3Note that there is a ‘grey zone’ of values of Mj between these two bounds, in which the step always succeeds.
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If follows that if our algorithm succeeds and recurses in a subspace f of dimension j then, with
probability at least 1− β,
c(f) ≥Mj−1 + s(f) ≥Mj − k
2
≥ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2
ε
log
1
β
− k
2
≥ n−
(
d− j + 3
2
)
k − 2
ε
log
1
β
.
That is, when we recurse in f of dimension j we lose at most
(
d− j + 32
)
k + 2ε log
1
β points.
Denote by d0 = d, d1, . . . , dt the sequence of dimensions into which the procedure recurses (reaching
the base case at dimension dt ≥ 0). Hence, keeping k fixed throughout the recursion, at the r-th
recursive step we lose at most
(
dr − dr+1 + 32
)
k + 2ε log
1
β points. Summing up these losses over
r = 0, . . . , t− 1, the total loss is at most
(d0 − dt)k + 3
2
kt+
2t
ε
log
1
β
≤ 5d
2
· k + 2d
ε
log
1
β
.
Substituting k = n4d , we get that the total number of points that we loose is at most
2n
3 if
n = Ω
(
d
ε log
1
β
)
, with a sufficiently large constant of proportionality.
Notice that we keep k fixed throughout the recursion and n may decrease. Consequently, if n′
is the number of points in some recursive call in some dimension ` < d, then n′ ≥ n3 and therefore
k = n4d ≤ 3n
′
4d which is still smaller than the centerpoint guarantee of
n′
`+1 .
As described, our subspace-selection procedure (with all its recursive calls) is 2d2ε-differentially
private. Dividing ε by 2d2 we get that our subspace-selection procedure is ε-differentially private,
and that the total number of points we lose is much smaller than n if n = Ω
(
d3
ε log
1
β
)
.
Recall Section 3, where we showed that we need n = Ω
(
d4 log dX
ε
)
for the (ε-differentially
private) base case to work correctly. (Recall also that the base case is actually applied in a suitable
projection of the terminal subspace onto some coordinate-frame subspace of the same dimension,
and that the above lower bound on n suffices for any such lower-dimensional instance too.)
The following theorem summarizes the result of this section.
Theorem 4.9. Given n = Ω
(
d4 log dX
ε +
d3 log 1
β
ε
)
points, our algorithm (including all recursive
calls and the base case) is ε-differentially private, runs in O
(
n1+(d−1)bd/2c
)
time, and finds a point
of depth at least k = n4d with probability at least 1− 2d2β.
Proof. The privacy statement follows by composition, using Lemma 4.5 and the privacy properties
of the exponential mechanism. The confidence bound follows since the probability of failure of the
recursive call in a subspace of dimension j is at most (j + 1)β. The running time of the algorithm
is dominated by the running time of the exponential mechanism that we perform at the bottom
(base case) of the recursion.
5 An O(nd) algorithm via volume estimation
The upper bound on the running time in Theorem 4.9 is dominated by the running time of the base
case, in which we compute all the regions D≥` explicitly, which takes nO(d
2) time. To reduce this
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cost, we use instead a mechanism that (a) estimates the volume of Dk to a sufficiently small relative
error, and (b) samples a random point “almost” uniformly from Dk. We show how to accomplish
(a) and (b) using the volume estimation mechanisms of Lova´sz and Vempala [13] and later of
Cousins and Vempala [7]. We also show how to use these procedures to implement approximately
the exponential mechanism described in Section 3. These algorithms are Monte Carlo, so they fail
with some probability, and when they fail we may lose our ε-differential privacy guarantee. As a
result, the modified algorithm will not be purely differentially private, as the one in Section 3, and
we will only be able to guarantee that it is (ε, δ)-differentially private, for any prescribed δ > 0.
We obtain the following theorem which we prove in the rest of this section.
Theorem 5.1. Given n = Ω
(
d4 log dX
δ
ε
)
points, our algorithm (including all recursive calls and
the base case) is (ε, δ)-differentially private, runs in O
(
nd
)
time, and finds a point of depth at least
k = n4d with probability at least 1− δ.
5.1 Volume estimation
We use the following result of Cousins and Vempala for estimating the volumes of the convex
polytopes D≥k.
Theorem 5.2 (Cousins and Vempala [7, Theorem 1.1]). Let K be a convex body in Rd that contains
the unit ball around the origin and satisfies EK(||X||2) = O(d).4 Then, for any α, β > 0, there is an
algorithm that can access K only via membership queries (each determining whether a query point
q lies in K), and, with probability at least 1−β, approximates the volume of K with a relative error
α (i.e., in the range 1± α times the true volume), and performs O
(
d3
α2
log2 d log2
1
α
log2
d
α
log
1
β
)
membership queries in K.
We do not know when the algorithm fails; failure simply means that the value that it returns
is not within the asserted range.
Membership tests. Given a query point q and a parameter `, to test whether q ∈ D≥` amounts
to verifying that q lies in each of the halfspaces whose intersection forms D≥`. Lemma 3.1 shows
that there are at most O(nd−1) such halfspaces, and we can prepare in advance a list of these
halfspaces, as a by-product of the construction of the arrangement A(S∗) of the hyperplanes dual
to the points in S. Thus we can implement a membership query in O(nd−1) time. (Recall that we
hide in the O(·)-notation factors that are polynomial in d.)
In order to bring D≥` into the ‘rounded’ form assumed in Theorem 5.2, we use an algorithm of
Lova´sz and Vempala [13] to bring a convex body K into an approximate isotropic position.
Definition 5.3. A convex body K in Rd is in isotropic position if for every unit vector v ∈ Rd,∫
K(v ·x)dx = 1. K is in t-nearly isotropic position if for every unit vector v ∈ Rd, 1t ≤
∫
K(v ·x)dx ≤
t.
It is easy to verify that if K is in t-nearly isotropic position then EK(||X||2) ≤ td.
4Here EK is expectation under the uniform measure within K.
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Theorem 5.4 (Lova´sz and Vempala [13, Theorem 1.1]). There is an algorithm that, given a convex
body K that contains the unit ball around the origin and is contained in a ball of radius R, and a
confidence parameter β > 0, brings K into a 2-nearly isotropic position. The algorithm succeeds
with probability at least 1− β, and performs O(d4 log7 d log dβ logR) membership queries in K.
We can use some of our observations in Section 3 to show:
Lemma 5.5. Each of the polytopes D≥` of nonzero volume contains a ball of radius at least
1
(d+1)(d(d+1)/2Xd)
d(d+1)+1 .
Proof. As we showed in Section 3, each vertex of D≥` has rational coordinates of common integral
denominator of value at most dd(d+1)/2Xd
2
. We take d+1 linearly independent vertices of D≥`, and
denote by z their center of mass, which is guaranteed to be inside D≥`. This center of mass z has
rational coordinates with a common integer denominator of value at most (d+1)(dd(d+1)/2Xd
2
)(d+1).
We also showed in Section 3 that each hyperplane h defining D≥` has integer coefficients of
absolute value at most dd/2Xd.
The largest radius of a ball enclosed in D≥` and centered at z is the minimum distance of z
from the defining (supporting) hyperplanes of D≥`. The distance from any such hyperplane h is
positive (since z lies in the interior of D≥`), and is a rational whose denominator is the common
denominator of the coordinates of z times the Euclidean norm of the vector of coefficients of h,
excluding the free term, which is at most
√
ddd/2Xd. That is, this distance is at most
1
(d+ 1)dd(d+1)2/2Xd2(d+1) · d(d+1)/2Xd =
1
(d+ 1)
(
d(d+1)/2Xd
)d(d+1)+1 .
This implies the lemma.
D≥` is contained in the unit cube, and therefore it is contained in a ball of radius
√
d. It
follows that we can scale D≥` so that it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.4, with R =
(d+ 1)3/2
(
d(d+1)/2Xd
)d(d+1)+1
. Hence we have logR = O(d3(logX + log d)).
Our entire volume estimation algorithm applies Theorem 5.4 to D≥` and then Theorem 5.2 to
the ‘rounded’ polytope. By the union bound it fails with probability at most 2β. The running time
is larger by a factor of O(d2) than the number of membership queries.
5.2 Implementing the exponential mechanism
We now show how to use the estimates of the volumes of the polytopes D≥` to sample “almost”
uniformly from a region D`, which is picked with probability µ
′
`, where
1− α
1 + α
µ` ≤ µ′` ≤
1 + α
1− αµ`, and µ` =
eε`/2Vol(D`)∑
j≥0 eεj/2Vol(Dj)
,
as defined in Section 3.
We carry out this modified sampling by defining new probabilities λ′j , for j = 0, . . . , tdmax(S) (so
that
∑
j λ
′
j = 1), choosing the region D≥` (rather than D`) with probability λ
′
` and then sampling
almost uniformly a point in the chosen region D≥`, using the sampling algorithm in [7], whose
properties are stated in the following theorem. In the theorem, the variation distance between two
measures µ, ν is maxB |µ(B)− ν(B)|, over all possible events B.
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Theorem 5.6 (Cousins and Vempala [7, Theorem 1.2]). Let K be a convex body in Rd that contains
the unit ball around the origin and satisfies EK(||X||2) = O(d). Then, for any η, β > 0, there is
an algorithm that can access K only via membership queries, and, with probability at least 1 − β,
generates random points from a distribution U ′K that is within total variation distance at most η
from the uniform distribution on K. The algorithm performs O(d3 log d log2 dη log
1
β ) membership
queries for each random point that it generates. The running time is larger by a factor of O(d2)
than the number of membership queries.
Exact sampling. Let us denote V` := Vol(D≥`) and v` := Vol(D`). We first derive probabilities
λ` such that if we pick D≥` with probability λ`, and then pick a point uniformly from D≥`, then
we simulate the exponential mechanism (over the regions D`) exactly.
The probability that q ∈ Dm, conditioned on having chosen D≥` to sample from, is vm/V` for
m ≥ `; it is 0 for m < `. Therefore, the unconditional probability that q ∈ Dm is
∑
`≤m
λ`
V`
 vm,
and we want this probability to be proportional to eεm/2vm. That is, we want all the equalities∑
`≤m
λ`
V`
= Ceεm/2, for m ≥ 0, to hold, for a suitable normalizing parameter C. Putting x` = λ`/V`,
we get the triangular system
∑
`≤m
x` = Ce
εm/2, for m ≥ 0, which solves to
x0 = C, and x` = C
(
eε`/2 − eε(`−1)/2
)
= C
(
1− e−ε/2
)
eε`/2,
for ` ≥ 1. That is, to ensure that ∑`≥0 λ` = 1, we then put
C =
1
V0 +
(
1− e−ε/2)∑j≥1 eεj/2Vj ,
and
λ0 = CV0, and λ` = C
(
1− e−ε/2
)
eε`/2V`, for ` ≥ 1.
Approximate sampling. We approximate these probabilities, by replacing the exact volumes
V` by their approximate values V
′
` that we obtain from Theorems 5.4 and 5.2, and get the cor-
responding approximations C ′ to C and λ′` to λ`. By construction, and by the probability union
bound, we have, for the prescribed error parameter α < 1, with probability at least 1 − 2nβ,
(1− α)V` ≤ V ′` ≤ (1 + α)V`, for every ` = 0, . . . , tdmax(S), which is easily seen to imply that
1− α
1 + α
λ` ≤ λ′` ≤
1 + α
1− αλ`, for every `. (3)
We sampleD≥` using the probabilities λ′`, and then sample fromD≥` using Theorem 5.6. Denote
by Prexp(B), for any measurable subset B of [0, 1]
d, the probability that the pure exponential
mechanism, that uses the (costly to compute) exact values λ`, as just reviewed, returns a point in
B. It follows that the conditional probability Pr(B) of returning a point in B, conditioned on all
the parameters λ′` satisfying the inequalities (3), and conditioned on successful sampling from D≥`
using Theorem 5.6, satisfies
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Lemma 5.7.
1− α
1 + α
Prexp(B)− η ≤ Pr(B) ≤ 1 + α
1− αPrexp(B) + η . (4)
Proof. Indeed, by definition of our algorithm we have that
Pr(B) =
∑
`≥0
Pr (B|D≥`) ·Pr(D≥`), (5)
where D≥` is a mnemonic for the event that the mechanism decides to sample from the region D≥`.
By Theorem 5.6 we have that
Pru (B|D≥`)− η ≤ Pr (B|D≥`) ≤ Pru (B|D≥`) + η , (6)
where Pru (B|D≥`) is the probability to get a point in B if we sample uniformly from D≥`. Com-
bining Equations (5) and (6) we get that∑
`≥0
Pru (B|D≥`) ·Pr(D≥`)− η ≤ Pr(B) ≤
∑
`≥0
Pru (B|D≥`) ·Pr(D≥`) + η . (7)
Now Pr(D≥`) in our approximation scheme is λ′`, so we get, using (3), that
1− α
1 + α
∑
`≥0
λ`Pru (B|D≥`)− η ≤ Pr(B) ≤ 1 + α
1− α
∑
`≥0
λ`Pru (B|D≥`) + η ,
which implies the lemma by our argument regarding the exact simulation of the exponential mech-
anism given above.
If we set η = δ, β to be some constant multiple of δn (we divide by n to account for the failure
probablity over D≥` for all `’s), and α to be a constant multiple of ε then it follows from Equation
(4) that our approximation of the exponential mechanism is (ε, δ)-private.
It is also easy to verify that the utility of our approximate exponential mechanism is essentially
the same as the utility analysis in Section 3. This proves Theorem 5.1.
6 Conclusions
We gave an O(nd)-time algorithm for privately computing a point in the convex hull of Ω(d4 logX)
points with coordinates that are multiples of 1/X in [0, 1]. Even though this gives a huge improve-
ment of what was previously known and requires some nontrivial technical effort, and sophisticated
sampling and volume estimation tools, this running time is still not satisfactory for large values of
d. The main hurdle in improving it further is the nonexistence of efficient algorithms for computing
Tukey depths and Tukey levels.
The main question that we leave open is whether there exists a differentially private algorithm
for this task which is polynomial in n and d ? (when the input size, n, is still polynomial in logX
and d).
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